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From the 1990’s onwards the cigarette industry in South Africa has imposed substantial 
increases in the real net-of-tax price of cigarettes.  Past research has presented various 
possible reasons for this increase, however none of this research has incorporated the 
effect that the international environment might have on price setting in the cigarette 
industry through tariffs.  Using a Bertrand duopolistic model this paper presents a 
theoretical model to explain the effect that tariffs, and other relevant causal factors such 
as excise taxation might have on the real net-of-tax price.  The relationships that exist 
between the real net-of-tax price and causal factors are then subjected to a preliminary 
analysis using an Autoregressive Distributed Lag Model.  The results indicate that there 
is a relationship between the price of cigarettes and various causal factors.  The results 
do not however substantiate what caused the real net-of-tax price increase from 1990’s 
onwards.  The paper attributes this to various limitations in the preliminary analysis 
process and suggests how these could be rectified.  The paper hence presents a useful 
foundation to understanding the nature of the existing relationships between the price of 
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The South African cigarette industry has been imposing high increases in the real net-
of-tax (NOT) price over the past 20 years.  Based on price data obtained from the 
Budget Review, between 1990 and 2013, the real NOT cigarette price has increased 
substantially by approximately 107%.  This has occurred in the presence of rising excise 
taxes and some researchers have concluded that the cigarette industry has used this 
opportunity to increase the real NOT price of cigarettes (Van Walbeek, 2006).  This can 
be established by looking at the graph below.   
 
Figure 1.1:  Composition of the real retail price of cigarettes in South Africa (1961-
2012) 
 
Source: Budget Review, various years 
Figure 1.1 shows the composition of the real retail price between 1961 and 2012.  
Specifically it shows the trends in the real NOT price, the excise tax rate and the Value 
Added Tax/General Sales Tax from 1961 to 2012.  Between 1960 and 1980, the real 
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because of a significant decrease in the level of the excise tax.  In South Africa, the 
excise tax is levied as a specific tax.  In the 1980’s the nominal excise tax increases 
were very low and hence these increases were eroded by the high inflation rate during 
this time period.  Between 1961 and 1991 the real retail price of a pack of cigarettes 
decreased from R6.17 to R3.50 (Van Walbeek, 2006).  Of this decrease, 75% was due 
to a decrease in the excise and sales taxes.  A substantial increase in the retail price 
can then be seen from 1990 to 2012.  This increase is driven primarily by the substantial 
increases in the real NOT price of cigarettes during this time period.  Specifically, the 
increase in the real NOT cigarette prices accounts for more than 40% of the increase in 
the real retail price of cigarettes during from 1990 to 2012 (Van Walbeek, 2006).  The 
rate of these increases seems to slow down in 1999. 
The phenomenon of increasing NOT prices in the presence of rising excise taxes is not 
unique to South Africa; in 1983, Harris(1987) noted that an increase in the federal 
excise tax in the United States of America (USA) resulted in non-cost related increases 
of 20% in the NOT prices of cigarettes.  This illustrates that it is not uncommon for 
industry prices of cigarettes to increase when excise taxes are raised. 
What is interesting to note is that these price increases in South Africa are coupled with 
a highly concentrated cigarette market in which the top three firms (British American 
Tobacco, Japan Tobacco International and Phillip Morris International) account for 
95.4% of the total market value of the cigarette industry in South Africa.  Of these three 
firms, British American Tobacco (BAT) is the one with the most pricing power with a 
market share of 89.5% as of 2012 (MarketLine, 2013).  The near monopoly position that 
BAT holds in the cigarette market is further cemented by the high tariffs on cigarettes 
imposed by the South African government.  As of 2005, tobacco was among the top 5 
protected sectors with an effective rate of protection in excess of 40% (Edwards, 2005).  
Data for the year 2010 indicates that the weighted average tariff on cigarettes in South 
Africa was almost double that of Brazil, and approximately six times that of the USA 
(United Nations Commodities Trade Statistics Database [UN-COMTRADE], 2013).  
South African cigarette import tariffs are therefore exceptionally high. 
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The aim of this paper is to examine the real NOT cigarette price increases in South 
Africa from the 1990’s onwards and attempt to discover what could have caused these 
increases.  This paper’s main contribution will be to consider how developments in the 
international market could have had an impact on the real NOT price of cigarettes in 
South Africa.  This paper will do so by reviewing literature on the causes of real NOT 
price increases in the cigarette industry in South Africa and in other countries.  These 
causes will be discussed under six categories; high market concentration in the 
cigarette industry, input costs, excise taxes, advertising bans and other tobacco control 
measures, reduced cigarette consumption, and other possible explanations.  This paper 
will then examine the developments in the international market and their impact on the 
real NOT price of cigarettes in two ways.  Firstly a theoretical framework will be 
presented based on existing models in international trade.  Secondly this framework will 
be used to present testable hypotheses which will then be modelled empirically using an 




2.1 The Cigarette Industry in South Africa 
 
The story of the cigarette manufacturing industry in South Africa is really the story of the 
Rembrandt Group (Van Walbeek, 2005).  The Rembrandt group has been around since 
the formation of its predecessor, the Voorbrand Tobacco Company, in 1940.  In 1948 
Voorbrand was replaced by the Rembrandt Group.  Rembrandt’s non-South African 
tobacco interests were represented by its subsidiary, Rothmans International (Van 
Walbeek, 2005).  This subsidiary was sold to UK based British American Tobacco plc.  
By the time of the sale Rembrandt had 85% of the South African cigarette market, with 
its closest competitor being British American Tobacco (then known as United Tobacco 
Company).  As a result of the acquisition of Rothman’s by BAT, BAT South Africa’s 
market share currently dominates the cigarette industry (Van Walbeek, 2005).  The 
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respective market shares of BAT and other major companies in the cigarette industry 
are as seen in the table below; 
Table 2.1: Percentage Market Shares of Firms in the South African Cigarette 
Industry 
Company % Share 
British American Tobacco Plc 89.5 
Japan Tobacco Inc. 4.2 
Philip Morris International Inc. 1.7 
Other 4.6 
Source: MarketLine, 2013 
Each of the companies mentioned above produces numerous cigarette brands.  BAT’s 
Peter Stuyvesant brand has the highest sales volume of all the cigarettes consumed in 
South Africa.  As of 2012, 40.9% of the cigarettes sold in retail outlets were of the Peter 
Stuyvesant brand.  Furthermore, all the top six most consumed cigarette brands in 
South Africa are manufactured by BAT (Euromonitor, 2014).  This is an indicator of just 
how thoroughly BAT dominates the cigarette market in South Africa. 
It is interesting to note that the three companies mentioned in Table 2.1 above, are 
among the four cigarette companies with the highest market share globally (MarketLine, 
2013).  This implies that high market concentration in the cigarette industry is not unique 
to South Africa.  This also implies that these companies’ ability to influence cigarette 
prices is not only limited to the domestic South African market. 
The high concentration of the cigarette industry in South Africa could in part be 
responsible for the increase in the real NOT cigarette prices.  This is because this 
concentration gives the major cigarette companies the opportunity to utilize their market 
power and increase mark-ups with the aim of making super normal profits.  This effect 
of high market concentration in the cigarette industry is exacerbated by the barriers to 
entry present in the cigarette industry in South Africa.  The stringent tobacco control 
measures in South Africa deter entry of potential competitors.  This, coupled with the 
high concentration of the cigarette industry provides a conducive environment for higher 
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prices as firms are no longer worried that making super normal profits will attract new 
entrants. 
2.2. International Trade and the Cigarette Market in South Africa 
 
2.2.1 Tariffs on imports of tobacco and tobacco products 
As mentioned previously, compared to global import tariff rates for tobacco and tobacco 
products, South African tariffs are relatively high.  This could possibly influence price 
setting in the cigarette industry.  The table below provides average ad valorem 
equivalent import tariff rates of tobacco and tobacco products for various partners in 
various years.  The partner regions looked at are the major ones with which South 
Africa presently has free trade area agreements.  Specifically these are the European 
Free Trade Area (EFTA, comprised of Norway, Switzerland, Liechtenstein and Iceland), 




Table 2.1  Average Ad valorem equivalent tariff rates of tobacco and tobacco 
products in South Africa by product type in various years  
Partner 
Year 

















































































Source: South African Tariff Schedule 1, various years & UN COMTRADE, various years.  Some data is 
missing for EFTA tariff rates 
For tobacco and tobacco products, South Africa uses specific tariffs, mixed tariffs (a 
combination of specific and ad valorem type duties) as well as ad valorem tariffs 
depending on the product line item.  The ad valorem equivalents for the specific tariffs 
are calculated by dividing the specific tariff value by the import unit values of the 
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products (import value divided by import quantity).  For the mixed tariffs, the ad valorem 
part of the mixed tariff is taken to be the ad valorem equivalent. 
In 1995 and 2000, all the partner regions have the same ad valorem tariffs.  This is 
probably because the various free trade area agreements (FTA) covering the partner 
regions had not yet come into effect.  The EFTA agreement with the Southern African 
Customs Union (SACU), of which South Africa is a member, only became applicable on 
1 May 2008 (South African Revenue Services [SARS], 2013) while the South Africa-EU 
Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TCDA) was signed in 1999 
(European Commission, 2011). 
From 2000 onwards, tariff rates decrease for raw tobacco and other tobacco products 
with the highest decrease being seen in the SADC tariff rates.  With the exception of the 
SADC and EFTA tariff rates, the cigarette tariffs actually increase.  It would seem South 
Africa is hence protecting their cigarette manufacturing industry more than the raw 
tobacco or other tobacco products industries. 
 
2.2.2 Imports and Exports of tobacco and tobacco products 
The importance of international trade in the tobacco and tobacco products industry can 
be seen by the high volumes of imports and exports of these products by South Africa.  




Table 2.2  Values of Imports of tobacco and tobacco products to South Africa 




1995 2000 2005 2010 
SADC countries 37558.02 26413.78 26126.59 46477.21 
EFTA countries 1671.47 774.244 1659.203 3468.164 
Europe 1803.208 3736.19 26210.82 30732.71 
USA 10858.1 6191.104 3439.70 3266.839 
Rest of the world 12508.472 11018.632 42947.487 131590.477 
Total imports 63499.27 48133.95 100383.8 215535.4 
Source: UN COMTRADE, various years.   
 
Table 2.3  Percentage Imports of tobacco and tobacco products to South Africa 
by partners in various years  
Partner 
Years 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
SADC countries 59.1 54.9 26.0 21.6 59.1 
EFTA countries 2.6 1.6 1.7 1.6 2.6 
Europe 2.8 7.8 26.1 14.3 2.8 
USA 17.1 12.9 3.4 1.5 17.1 
Rest of the world 19.7 22.9 42.8 61.1 19.7 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on data from UN COMTRADE, various years 
Looking at Table 2.2 and 2.3, there is generally a high volume of tobacco and tobacco 
products imports with the highest share of these imports coming from the SADC region 
in 1990, 1995 and 2010.  The imports are further disaggregated into product types in 




Table 2.4  Values of Imports of tobacco and tobacco products to South Africa by 
product type in various years (1000’s of USD) 
Partner 
Year 






























































































Total Imports 63499.28 48133.95 100383.8 215535.3 




Table 2.5  Percentage Imports of tobacco and tobacco products to South Africa 
by product type in various years (1000’s of USD) 
Partner 
Year 
1995 2000 2005 2010 
Raw tobacco 80.8 88.1 77.1 79.3 
Cigarettes 18 9.9 14.1 13.9 
Other tobacco 
products 
1.2 1.9 8.8 6.8 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on data from UN COMTRADE, various years 
Looking at Table 2.4 and 2.5 above, the majority of tobacco products imports are of raw 
tobacco, the biggest share of which is from SADC countries.  The share of raw tobacco 
in total imports has however been decreasing over time.  This is mainly driven by 
increased importation of the other tobacco products.   
A similar analysis is done with exports of tobacco and tobacco products.  The trends 
observed are as seen in the tables below. 
Table 2.6  Values of Exports of tobacco and tobacco products from South Africa 




1995 2000 2005 2010 
SADC countries 40329.13 61441.58 21564.24 34912.53 
EFTA countries 196.164 1280.432 1050.226 67.508 
Europe 4194.056 9457.715 11423.3 39289.97 
USA 293.555 923.212 8962.675 9938.011 
Rest of the world 14255.53 36041.56 122995.56 158862.58 
Total exports 59268.43 109144.5 165996 243070.6 




Table 2.7  Percentage exports of tobacco and tobacco products from South Africa 
by partners in various years  
Partner 
Years 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
SADC countries 68.0 56.3 13.0 14.4 68.0 
EFTA countries 0.3 1.2 0.6 0.0 0.3 
Europe 7.1 8.7 6.9 16.2 7.1 
USA 0.5 0.8 5.4 4.1 0.5 
Rest of the world 24.1 33.0 74.1 65.4 24.1 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on data from UN COMTRADE, various years 
Looking at Table 2.6 and 2.7, there is generally a high volume of tobacco and tobacco 
products exports with the highest share of these exports going to the SADC region in 
1990, 1995 and 2010.  The total exports of tobacco products exceed the total imports in 
1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010.  This is interesting to note as one would expect that given 
the high level of tariffs compared to the tariffs of other countries, South Africa is not 
competitive in the international tobacco and tobacco products market.  Clearly this is not 
the case, there is hence no clear trade-related motive for why the tariffs on tobacco and 
tobacco products are high in relation to those of other countries.  The exports are further 







Table 2.8  Values of Exports of tobacco and tobacco products from South Africa 
by product type in various years (1000’s of USD) 
Partner 
Year 






























































































Total Imports 59268.43 109144.5 165996 243070.6 





Table 2.9  Percentage exports of tobacco and tobacco products to South Africa 
by product type in various years (1000’s of USD) 
Partner 
Year 
1995 2000 2005 2010 
Raw tobacco 51.1 34.7 37.3 47.8 
Cigarettes 47.3 64.3 31.2 28.3 
Other tobacco 
products 1.5 0.9 31.4 23.9 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on data from UN COMTRADE, various years 
Looking at Table 2.8 and 2.9 above, similar to the imports, the majority of tobacco 
products exports are of raw tobacco except in 2000.  The biggest share of these raw 
tobacco exports is to SADC countries.  Given the SACU and the lower tariffs South 
Africa faces when exporting to other SACU member countries, this is not surprising.   
3. Why have Real NOT Cigarette Prices been rising: A Data 
and Literature Review 
As mentioned previously, from the 1990’s onwards, the real NOT price has increased 
substantially.  Based on a review of the existing literature and data available, the 
possible causes of the real NOT cigarette price increases are expounded below. 
3.1 High market concentration in the cigarette industry 
The cigarette industry, as mentioned previously is highly concentrated.  This high 
concentration has been said to give cigarette firm’s pricing power which could potentially 
explain the increase in real NOT cigarette prices.   
Van Walbeek (2006) noted that the retail price of cigarettes is shared not only by the 
cigarette manufacturers but by tobacco farmers, suppliers of other inputs, cigarette 
manufacturers, suppliers of logistical services, wholesalers and retailers.  Due to the 
high degree of competition between wholesalers and retailers, wholesale and retail 
margins are kept extremely low (less than 10%).  The presence of low retail and 
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wholesale margins, when combined with the highly concentrated market for cigarettes, 
provides conducive conditions for cigarette manufacturers to impose high cigarette 
prices and make abnormal profits. 
 
3.2 Input costs 
 
Increases in input costs could also cause increases in the price of a commodity.  Van 
Walbeek (2006), using data from Statistics South Africa (1961 – 2004) analysed input 
costs in the South African cigarette industry with the aim of determining whether a rise 
in input costs could be the cause of the increasing real NOT cigarette prices.  The main 
input costs in the cigarette manufacturing process are the costs of leaf tobacco, paper 
and labor.  For leaf tobacco, Van Walbeek (2006) looked at trends in flue-cured and 
dark air-cured tobacco (only types of raw tobacco produced in South Africa as of 2006).  
For this and all the other inputs, there was no evidence to indicate that input costs were 
behind the rise in the real NOT cigarette prices 
Van Walbeek (2006) cautioned however that some distortion was to be expected due to 
the fact that Producer Price Index (PPI) data was used for the analysis of paper costs. 
The PPI is based on a basket of products rather than the exact paper requirements of 
cigarette manufacturers in South Africa which might have distorted the results.  Van 
Walbeek (2006) also mentioned that cigarette manufacturing is a capital intensive 
process.  Labor costs therefore would not be expected to increase the real NOT prices 
of cigarettes. 
 
3.3 Excise Taxes  
As mentioned previously, researchers have speculated that the increase in excise taxes 
is a possible cause for the increase in the real NOT cigarettes that has occurred from 
the 1990’s onwards.  The trends of both excise taxes and the real NOT cigarette prices 
can be seen in Figure 3.1 below. 
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Figure 3.1  Real excise tax rates, real retail cigarette price and cigarette 
consumption in South Africa (1961 – 2012) 
 
Source: Budget Review, various years 
As can be seen above, the excise tax rate fell from 1961 to the early 1990’s with the 
exception of a slight increase between 1967 and 1971.  In June 1994 the government 
announced that it intended to increase the tax burden on cigarettes from 32% to 50% 
per cent of the retail price, to be phased in over a number of years (Van Walbeek, 
2006).  This would explain the increasing trend in the excise tax rate seen from the 
1990’s onwards.   
Some researchers have attributed the increase in real NOT cigarette prices to the 
increasing excise tax.  As is seen in Figure 3.1 above, the real retail price from 1990 
onwards has risen substantially in the presence of increasing excise taxes.  Specifically, 
for every 10 cents increase in the real level of excise tax between 1990 and 2012, the 
real retail price of cigarettes has increased by approximately 18 cents.  This, according 
to Van Walbeek (2006), implies that the cigarette firms in the industry are using the 
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From available data, the excise tax increases have been successful in reducing 
cigarette consumption.  Between 1990 and 2012 the real excise tax rate has 
approximately doubled. With this increase aggregate cigarette consumption decreased 
by approximately 41%.  Despite the large increases in excise tax, the high concentration 
in the cigarette industry has enabled the dominant firms to mitigate the effects of the 
excise tax increases on firm profits (Van Walbeek, 2006).  Specifically firms have been 
able to exponentially increase their markups and hence make up for the increased 
excise tax burden. 
Conclusively, excise tax increases have been used as firms as an opportunity to 
increase the real NOT price of cigarettes.  This has been easily achieved by the firms 
due to the high concentration in the cigarette market. 
3.4 Advertising bans and other tobacco control measures 
Numerous tobacco control measures have been put in place in South Africa ever since 
1995 when the first tobacco legislation, the Tobacco Products Control Act of 1993, 
became effective (Van Walbeek, 2005).  This legislation was relatively weak in 
comparison to global tobacco control measures at the time but from 1995 onwards, the 
tobacco control environment has become progressively more threatening for cigarette 
industries (Van Walbeek, 2006). 
Under the Tobacco Products Control Amendment of 1999 there was a complete ban of 
all tobacco product advertising and sponsorship (Van Walbeek, 2005).  Similar anti-
smoking legislature targeted at preventing advertising has also been used extensively in 
the USA (Farr et al, 2001).  Looking at the cigarette market in the USA, Farr et al (2001) 
showed that advertising bans limit competition in the cigarette market hence allowing 
incumbent firms to set high prices.  Advertising bans act as a barrier to entry; incumbent 
firms know that new entrants will find it hard to break into the market and hence are free 
to raise their mark-ups considerably in comparison to before implementation of the ban.  
A similar anti-competitive effect due to advertising bans in the US cigarette market was 
also observed by Tremblay & Tremblay (1999).  Given the effect advertising bans were 
seen to have had in the US cigarette market, advertising bans could have hence had an 
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anti-competitive effect in South Africa, similar to that mentioned by Farr et al (2001) in 
the USA.   
The progression of increased stringency in the tobacco control environment in South 
Africa has meant that cigarette companies that were already in the market pre-1995 
have found it easier to maintain and even cement their market shares.  Of the major 
cigarette companies currently in the South African market only BAT was in the industry 
before 1995.  This would imply that BAT had the opportunity to increase its market 
share through advertising and other market promotion strategies before such activities 
were banned hence cementing their share of the market.  
Advertising and promotional activities have also been cited by the cigarette industry as 
the main way to maintain and increase their market share (Lovato et al, 2003).  The 
inability to do so would therefore be a deterrent to new firms entering the cigarette 
industry.  Additionally, Tsai et al (2005) in his study of the Taiwanese cigarette market 
found that smokers exposed to adverts of the brand they smoke are less likely to reduce 
their smoking due to an increase in price.  For such consumers, an increase in the real 
retail price (through an increase in the real NOT price) would hence not result in 
reduced cigarette consumption as one would expect from general economic theory.  
The lowered responsiveness to price of consumers exposed to cigarette adverts, 
combined with the presence of BAT before the increased stringency of the tobacco 
control environment could partially explain the industry’s (and by extension BAT’s) 
ability to impose increases in the real NOT cigarette prices without fear of encouraging 
new entrants into the cigarette market. 
Policies that aim at limiting the prevalence of smoking tends such as excise taxation, 
advertising bans and other anti-smoking tobacco legislation tend to deter entry of new 
firms into the cigarette industry (MarketLine, 2013).  The tobacco legislation in South 
Africa combined with the use of excise taxation could have hence provided a favorable 
environment for the dominance of BAT in South Africa and hence indirectly contributed 




3.5 Reduced cigarette consumption 
The aim of tobacco control measures is the reduction of cigarette consumption.  If 
excise taxation, advertising bans and other anti-smoking legislature is successful in 
reducing cigarette consumption, this could result in firms raising their markups to ensure 
that profits are maintained despite the reduction in consumption.  According to Barnett 
et al (1995) this is a rational response in the presence of highly stringent tobacco control 
measures that could potentially reduce cigarette consumption.  In such a situation, firms 
would increase prices in order to extract as much consumer surplus as possible.  
Furthermore, the fact that the cigarette manufacturing market is highly concentrated 
implies that the cigarette manufacturers can increase their prices without fear that a 
competitor will undercut their price.   
Research has shown that advertising bans could potentially reduce cigarette 
consumption.  Wifpli & Samet (2009) in their study of the American cigarette market 
found that after the introduction of the broadcast advertisement ban (1971) in America 
adult cigarette consumption dropped.  Levy et al (2008) also found that of the decline in 
smoking prevalence in Thailand between 1991 and 2006, 21.8% was due to advertising 
and marketing bans.  On the other hand Chaloupka (1999) and Tremblay & Tremblay 
(1999) found that cigarette advertising has a small/insignificant impact on cigarette 
smoking.  If the advertising ban imposed in South Africa resulted in a drop in 
consumption, it could have encouraged companies to raise the real NOT price of 
cigarettes. 
Many researchers have found that the use of excise taxation is the most effective 
tobacco control policy in achieving reduction of cigarette consumption (Van Walbeek, 
2003).  Djutaharta et al (2005) noted that a 10% increase in the excise tax resulted in a 
6.1% decrease in consumption in Indonesia and Frieden et al (2003) in his analysis of 
cigarette consumption in New York found that between 2002 and 2003, increased 
taxation was the main reason for the decline in smoking prevalence.   
The real retail price has also been associated in research with declines in cigarette 
consumption.  Chaloupka (1999) found that an increase in cigarette prices would lead to 
a reduction in cigarette smoking.  He calculated that generally the price elasticity of 
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cigarette demand ranges from -0.3 to -0.5 implying that a 10% increase in cigarettes 
would reduce cigarette demand by 3% to 5%.  For South Africa, these elasticities have 
been found to be slightly higher and are in the range of -0.5 and -0.7 (Van Walbeek, 
2003). 
Conclusively, excise taxation, advertising bans, and retail price, through the effect they 
have on cigarette consumption, could have possibly contributed to a rise in the real 
NOT price of cigarettes. 
3.6 Other possible explanations  
Another possible explanation for the increase in the real NOT prices is put forth by 
Becker et al (1994).  Based on Becker and Murphy’s (1988) rational addiction 
framework, Becker et al (1994) motivated that it is rational for a monopolist to increase 
cigarette prices if the future demand for cigarettes decreases.  In the rational addiction 
framework, the only reason a monopolist would set low prices (low price is defined as a 
price where marginal revenue is less than marginal cost) would be if consumption is 
addictive and the monopolist is able to raise future prices above future marginal costs.  
The monopolist hence ‘traps’ consumers with low prices in the present, and only raises 
the price once future demand for the good, in this case cigarettes, decreases.  This 
reduction in future demand could be caused by increases in excise tax, or increased 
stringency in tobacco legislature.  According to Van Walbeek (2006), this framework fits 
the South African case well.  Real retail prices of cigarettes were relatively low until the 
1990’s when they started to rise.  This was around the same time when the Minister of 
Health started talking about introducing tobacco control legislation.  The Tobacco 
Products Control Act eventually became effective in 1995.  This, combined with the 
election of the African National Congress to power (1994) with their unsympathetic 
stance to the tobacco industry, would have signaled to the cigarette manufacturers that 
the tobacco control environment would only become more stringent.  Future demand for 
cigarettes would hence reduce.  Foreseeing this, according to the “rational addiction” 
framework, the most profitable course of action for cigarette manufacturers would be to 
raise the real NOT price of cigarettes.  This is indeed what happened in South Africa 
from the 1990’s onwards. 
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Koch (2004) mentioned a possible cause of the real NOT price increases similar to that 
presented by the “rational addiction” framework.  He motivated that two firms may 
initially be willing to charge a price that is lower than average cost if they anticipate that 
consumption of the good will result in brand loyalty and high switching costs.  The firms 
will in the future then be able to raise the price.  The extent to which the price will be 
raised will depend on how high the switching costs are and how ingrained brand loyalty 
is.  Addiction represents a psychological switching cost, hence cigarettes can be said to 
have high switching costs given their highly addictive nature.  There is however no 
literature regarding the nature of brand loyalty in the market for cigarettes (specifically in 
South Africa).  It hence cannot be said with certainty whether Koch’s (2004) reasoning 
could explain the real NOT price increases. 
Koch (2004) further motivated that when firms’ present prices are low, this allows them 
to gain market share.  Once the market share is high enough, the firms can then charge 
higher prices.  This matches the South African case in that real NOT prices fell slightly 
from the 1960’s to the 1980’s and then started rising from the 1990’s onwards.  There 
has however only been a slight increase in the market share of BAT over this time 
period, it is hence unlikely that this slight increase in the market share by itself could 
explain the real NOT price increases. 
Koch (2004) finally analyzed the South African cigarette market using a duopolistic 
Bertrand pricing model that accounted for the differences in the smoking behavior of 
young new smokers and old addicted smokers (he achieved this using an overlapping 
generations type model).  Koch (2004) concluded that the rise in real NOT prices is due 
to the lack of interest in cigarette consumption by the young population.  This lack of 
interest was mainly as a result of advertising bans and the ban on other promotional 
activities in South Africa.  Advertising and promotional activities were the main avenues 
through which young people were introduced to smoking.  Their removal hence caused 
the firms to shift their focus from the young new smokers to the old addicted smokers.  
Given the nature of addiction and brand loyalty, the firm could hence increase the real 
NOT prices without fear of losing the old smokers. 
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Despite putting forth various reasons for the real NOT cigarette price increase seen 
from the 1990’s onwards, the literature fails to account for the effect that high tariffs on 
tobacco and tobacco products in South Africa could have had on cigarette prices.  
Chaloupka & Nair (2000) argue that high trade barriers could result in increased 
monopoly power of incumbent firms.  This would hence indirectly feed through to the 
price of goods in such a market.  Based on this fact, the theoretical model proposed 
next will attempt to account for the effect tariffs have on price setting in cigarette 
markets, in addition to the effects of excise taxation and market concentration. 
 
4. Theoretical Model 
 
The nature of the interaction between BAT and its next biggest competitor PMI is 
modelled as a duopoly with the aim of understanding how price is determined in a highly 
concentrated market with excise taxation and tariffs.  This is in line with the assumption 
made by Koch (2004) in his analysis of the South African cigarette market.  Even 
though BAT has a much higher market share than that of PMI, it cannot be considered a 
monopolist given PMI’s ability to import cigarettes (Koch, 2004). Furthermore, given the 
fact that international trade is a key component of the South African cigarette market, 
and that there are not many global firms in the cigarette industry, it is more realistic to 
model the South African cigarette market as a duopoly than as a pure monopoly. 
Specifically, this paper uses the Bertrand theory of duopoly to model the strategic 
interaction between BAT and PMI.  This is similar to work done by Koch (2004) however 
this paper extends the Bertrand duopolistic model and uses it to model the effect of 
excise taxes and tariffs on the strategic interaction between the two firms.  The 
extension of the theory to include tariffs is similar to the theoretical extensions by 
Feenstra (2002) and Helpman & Krugman (1989).   
It is assumed that the domestic and import good are imperfect substitutes.  This is ideal 
for the case of PMI (from here on the foreign firm) and BAT (from here on the domestic 
firm) as the two produce different brands of cigarettes.  The price of the domestic good 
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is denoted by p1 and the price of the imported good is denoted by p2.  First, the model 
will be derived with the assumption that neither company pays tariffs or excise taxes, 
these will then be added into the model and finally the issue of entry of new firms into 
the market and the responsiveness of consumers to price changes of both domestic 
and imported cigarettes will be discussed.   
The derivation of the Bertrand model is fully done in Section 9.1 of the Appendix and 
follows from Davis & Garcés (2010) and Shum (2011).   
The following are the assumed demand equations for both the domestically produced 
and imported cigarettes.  The key issue to note here is that the quantity demanded of 
the domestic cigarettes is inversely related to its own price and directly related to the 
price of the imported cigarettes.  Furthermore, it is assumed that the quantity demanded 
of the domestic cigarettes is more responsive to a change in its own price than to a 
change in the price of the imported cigarettes (Shum, 2011).  Similarly, the quantity 
demanded of the imported cigarettes is inversely related to its own price and directly 
related to the price of the domestically produced cigarettes.  It is again assumed that the 
quantity demanded of the imported cigarettes is more responsive to a change in its own 
price than to a change in the price of the domestically produced cigarettes (b11 > b12 and 
b22 > b21) 
Demand for the domestically produced cigarettes, q1 = a1 – b11p1 + b12p2 
Demand for the imported cigarettes, q2 = a2 – b22p2 + b21p1 




















Cross price elasticity of demand for the domestically produced cigarettes is dependent 























It is assumed that both firms face constant marginal costs (c) and that both firms 
maximize their profits taking the other firm’s behavior as given.  Prices are hence set 
simultaneously without the firm’s knowing each other’s price choice.  The profit 
equations are hence as below; 
π1= (p1 – c) (a1 – b11p1 + b12p2) 
π2= (p2 – c) (a2 – b22p2 + b21p1) 
 
In order to determine the profit maximizing price, profit maximization equations are 








 + c 2⁄          (2) 
 
Equations 1 and 2 give the best response functions for both the domestic and the 





The iso-profit curves of the domestic firm π1 increase to the right (as p increases π1 
increases) while the iso-profit curves of the foreign firm π2 increase upward (as q 
increases π2 increases).  From the above diagram, the domestic firm and the foreign 
firm are strategic complements.  The domestic firm and the foreign firm optimally set 
their prices simultaneously at equilibrium A given their beliefs about what the other 
firm’s price will be. 
If symmetric prices are assumed, the price at A can be calculated using equations (1) 








































4.1 The inclusion of an excise tax 
 
If an excise tax is levied on the sale of cigarettes, both the importing firm and the 
domestically producing firm are directly affected.  The excise tax (e) will affect the 
marginal costs of the firms and their new profit functions will be as below; 
π1= (p1 – c - e) (a1 – b11p1 + b12p2) 
π2= (p2 – c - e) (a2 – b22p2 + b21p1) 




 + c 2⁄  + 
e




 + c 2⁄  + 
e
2⁄         (4) 
The inclusion of excise taxes changes the Bertrand equilibrium point.  This can be seen 




Again, assuming symmetric prices, the new equilibrium price after the imposition of the 
excise tax can be calculated from equations (3) and (4) and the following result 
obtained; 
p**=
2b22a1+b12 a2+b12b22c+b12b22e + 2b22b11c+ 2b22b11e
4b22b11−b12b21
 
















































In the equation above, b is related to the own price elasticity of demand and d is related 
to the cross price elasticity of demand.  If d was zero (i.e. the domestic cigarettes and 
the imported cigarettes were independent of each other), a unit change in the excise tax 
would increase the price of cigarettes by half a unit.  Due to the domestic and imported 
cigarettes being imperfect substitutes, d will always be above zero.  The closer the 
degree of substitution between the domestic good and the imported good the higher the 
price change in response to a change in the excise tax rate will be.  This is because 
since they are only 2 firms in the market, if the cross price elasticity of demand is high 
and one firm changes their price slightly, the change in the quantity demanded of the 
substitute good will be much higher than the change in price that induced it.  This 
increased demand for the substitute good will drive up the price of the substitute good 
causing a higher increase in the price due to the change in the excise rate than what 
would have been the case if the goods were not close substitutes (d=0).  Since prices 
are determined simultaneously in this model both prices will increase.  The closer the 
degree of substitution between the cigarettes produced by BAT and PMI, the higher the 
cigarette price increase induced by a change in the excise tax.  This could possibly 
explain the increase in the real NOT price increases in the cigarette market. 
 
4.2 The inclusion of tariffs 
 
As mentioned previously, much of the literature attempting to explain the increase in the 
NOT price of cigarettes fails to include the international environment as a possible 
explanation for the observed price increases.  The inclusion of tariffs in the Bertrand 
model is hence an important part of this paper’s theoretical model.   
The levying of a tariff only directly affects the importing firm.  The reaction functions of 
the domestically producing firm will therefore stay the same. 
Assuming that p2 = p3 + τ, where τ represents the tariff and p3 is the tariff exclusive 
foreign price, the reaction function of the importing firm can be recalculated as below.  
For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that the tariff is levied as a specific tariff.  The 
profit function of firm 2 therefore becomes 
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π2= {p2 – τ −  c −  e} {a2 – b22(p2 − τ)  +  b21p1} 




 + τ + c 2⁄ +
e
2⁄         (5) 
With this new reaction curves for the importing firm, a new Bertrand equilibrium, C is 










































Again, assuming symmetric prices, the new equilibrium price after the imposition of the 
tariff in the presence of the excise tax can be calculated from equations (3) and (5) and 
the following equation obtained 
p***=
2b22a1+b12 a2+2b12τ+b12b22c+b12b22e + 2b22b11c+ 2b22b11e
4b22b11−b12b21
= 















From the above equation, holding own price elasticity constant, the limit of 
𝜕p∗∗∗
𝜕τ
 as d 
tends to infinity is 0 (L’Hospital’s rule).  Therefore the higher d is, the less the change in 
price induced by a change in tariffs.  This implies that the higher the degree of 
substitutability between the goods, the less the pass through of tariffs to the price.  This 
is probably explained by the fact that an importer, knowing that the domestic good and 
his own are highly substitutable, would be wary to pass through too much of the tariff as 
a change in price would result in a much larger shift of the consumers to the domestic 
good.  The reverse of this is that if the goods have very low substitutability, the importer 
would pass through more of the tariff than if the goods were highly substitutable.  If the 
cigarettes produced by PMI and BAT have very low substitutability, this could possibly 
explain the increase in the real NOT price.   
 
4.3 Entry of new firms into the market. 
As mentioned previously, there is literature to suggest that the advertising ban in the 
cigarette market and consolidation of the market itself has allowed for a highly 
concentrated cigarette market which has influenced price setting.  In this model, the 
effect of increased market concentration can be studied by looking at the reverse 




The entry of new firms would reduce the responsiveness of each firm’s quantity 
demanded to the prices of the other possible substitutes in the market.  This is because 
as the number of firm’s increases, the residual demand faced by any firm in the market 
becomes less and less.   






, holding own price elasticity constant, this would mean 
that the increase in price due to a unit increase in the excise rate would be less than 
before entry of the firms.  This hence implies that market concentration contributes to a 
higher pass through of excise taxes to cigarette prices. 
 
4.4 Responsiveness of consumers to price changes 
 
The degree of responsiveness of consumers to changes in price is likely to alter the 
strategic interaction discussed in the theoretical model.  Due to the addictive nature of 
cigarettes and the high brand loyalty consumers attach to their brand, an increase in 
prices is likely to significantly change the consumer profile for a firm’s good.  A firm is 
likely to be left with consumers who are much less responsive to changes in price than 
would be the case in other non-addictive markets.   
When consumers are less responsive to price, this will cause a drop in the own price 
elasticity of demand (b11 and b22).  This would make the reaction functions of the firm’s 
steeper hence amplifying the increases in price induced by the excise tax and the tariff.   
The theoretical model presented shows that the price set in the market for cigarettes is 
related to the excise rate and the tariffs.  The degree to which the excise rate and the 
tariffs will affect the price in the market can be influenced by the responsiveness of 
consumers to price changes (own price elasticity of demand), the degree of 
substitutability of the goods produced by the firms (cross price elasticity of demand), 
and the market concentration of the industry.  With suitable data, the relationship 






The aim of the methodology used in this paper is to perform a preliminary analysis on 
the relationship between the price of cigarettes and the factors that, based on the theory 
motivated above, would affect this price.  This preliminary analysis is purely to check the 
consistency of the relationships derived in the theoretical model.  Specifically the paper 
makes use of quarterly data from 1990 to 2013 of the following variables.  For each of 
the statistical analyses, all the variables are expressed in natural logarithmic terms to 
reduce the variance in the data. 
(i) The Consumer price index (CPI) of tobacco and tobacco products obtained 
from Statistics South Africa (2000 prices).  This is used to represent the price 
of cigarettes 
(ii) The nominal excise rate (in rands per pack of 20 cigarettes) obtained from the 
Budget Review printed by the Republic of South Africa 
(iii) Tariffs obtained from the South Africa tariff book and the United Nations 
Commodity and Trade Statistics Database (UN-COMTRADE) 
(iv) The exchange rate (South African rand per US dollar) obtained from the 
Quantec EasyData database 
(v) Raw tobacco prices in US dollars obtained from the World Bank Global 
Economic Monitor (GEM) Commodities database.  These are converted to 
rand values using the exchange rate data and are used to represent the 
international price of raw tobacco. 
(vi) Final consumption expenditure by households obtained from the South 
African Reserve Bank (SARB) (2000 prices) 
The challenge with using quarterly time series data is that it tends to be nonstationary.  
Variables that are nonstationary tend to not return to a constant value or linear trend 
over time.  Hence the relationship between such series cannot be modelled using 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation as OLS assumes that the variables are 
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stationary.  Furthermore, using OLS to model relationships between nonstationary 
variables would lead to a spurious regression problem.  This occurs when there appears 
to be a statistically significant relationship between two variables that are unrelated 
(Wooldridge, 2009). 
The difficulty in modelling relationships using nonstationary data is eliminated if the data 
are cointegrated.  If two or more series of data are nonstationary, but a linear 
combination of the two series is stationary, then they are said to be cointegrated and 
long-run equilibrium relationships between the two series are said to exist (Engle & 
Granger, 1987).  If series are cointegrated, the residuals of their linear combination are 
stationary.  It is hence possible to make useful inferences on the nature of the short run 
and long run relationships between the series using least squares estimation. 
In order to conduct a preliminary analysis of the relationship between the price of 
cigarettes and the other variables listed previously the following methodology is used. 
 
5.1 The Augmented Dickey Fuller Test (ADF) 
 
This is a test used to determine whether series data is nonstationary or stationary.  This 
is run first and if the data are stationary, normal OLS estimation methods can be used 
without the application of any further statistical techniques before doing so.  If the data 
are nonstationary, the first differences of the time series are put through the ADF test.  
This process is repeated until a stationary series emerges at which point the order of 
integration of the series can be determined based on the number of differences tested 
before a stationary series is obtained (Samimi, 1995).  This is necessary as the next 
step (testing for cointegration) requires that the data be integrated of the same order 
(Ssekume, 2011). 
 




Next, the series are checked for cointegration using the Johansen test of cointegration.  
This method is used when one suspects that there is more than one cointegrating 
vector in the dataset.  Given that this paper’s analysis is a preliminary one, the use of 
this test is purely for the purpose of ensuring that the variables are cointegrated which 
implies the existence of a long-run relationship; and to determine how many stable 
relationships exist between the nonstationary series.  Confirming the existence of 
cointegration is necessary as it allows the use of least squares estimation to study the 
existing relationship between the series data.   
 
5.3 Estimation of an Autoregressive Distributed Lag Model (ARDL) 
 
Once the presence of cointegration has been established, an ARDL (1 1 1) model is 
estimated to study the relationship between the price of cigarettes and the other 
variables listed previously.  Important to note here is despite the fact that the Johansen 
test of cointegration result could indicate the existence of more than one cointegrating 
vector; for the sake of preliminary analysis this paper only estimates a single equation.  
It is hence implicitly assumed that all the explanatory variables in the ARDL model are 
exogenously determined.  This is sufficient given the preliminary nature of this paper’s 
analysis and the fact that it allows for the comparison of the empirical relationships to 
the theoretical relationships developed previously. 
The following is the relationship assumed between the price of cigarettes, the 
international price of raw tobacco, the excise rate, the tariff rate and the income of 
households 
CPIt = αCPIt-1 +β1Xt + β2Xt-1 + εt 
CPIt is the consumer price index for tobacco products in South Africa at time t.  β1  is 
the vector of all the coefficients of the international price of raw tobacco, the excise rate, 
the tariff rate and the income of households, while Xt  is the variables vector for all the 
aforementioned variables.  β2 is the vector of all the coefficients on the lagged term of 
the international price of raw tobacco, the excise rate, the tariff rate and the income of 
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households while Xt-1 is the variables vector of the lagged terms of all the 
aforementioned variables.  εt is an error term whose nature is dependent on the 
stationarity of the time series in the equation.  Specifically, if the time series data for 
both the explained and explanatory variables is nonstationary, the error term would be 
expected to be stationary. 
The equation above can be written in the form of an error correction model as below; 
CPIt = αCPIt-1 +β1Xt + β2Xt-1 + εt 
CPIt – CPIt-1= αCPIt-1 – CPIt-1+ β1Xt - β1Xt-1 + β1Xt-1 + β2Xt-1 + εt 




 𝐗𝐭−𝟏} + β1ΔXt + εt 
ΔCPIt = −(1-α){CPIt−1 −
𝛃𝟏+𝛃𝟐
1−α
 𝐗𝐭−𝟏} + β1ΔXt + εt 
The modelling of an equation similar to the one above allow estimates for the β1, β2 and 
(1-α) parameters to be obtained.  These will then give a preliminary picture of the nature 
of the aforementioned relationships in the South African cigarette market which can 




6.0 Graphical Analysis 
 
Figure 6.1  Trends in the logarithmic variables of the CPI of tobacco products, the 
international price of raw tobacco (rands value), private consumption, the tariff 
rate and the nominal excise tax rate 
 
Source: Statistics South Africa, World Bank GEM Commodities Database, SARB, Budget Review, UN 
COMTRADE & The South African Tariff Schedule, various years 
Figure 6.1 above shows trends in the CPI of tobacco products, the international raw 
tobacco price (in rands), private consumption, (1+tariff) and the excise rate.  Tariff 
changes occur once a year, tariffs therefore would only be expected to cause level 
changes in the movement of the CPI of tobacco products.  This can be seen around 
1994Q1 and 1994Q2 where the tariff increased and the slope of the CPI curve also 
increased slightly.  The correlation coefficient between the CPI of tobacco products and 
the tariff rate however is approximately 0.307.  This might indicate the existence of a 
weak relationship between the two series. 
The correlation coefficient between the excise rate and the CPI of tobacco products is 
quite high at 0.993.  This is not surprising as their trends are similar.  The excise rate is 










































































































































of incomplete pass through of excise taxes to cigarette prices, an outcome similar to 
that of the theoretical model developed previously.  Private consumption and 
international raw tobacco prices are highly correlated to the CPI of tobacco products 
with correlation coefficients of 0.969 and 0.934 respectively.  Looking at the 
international raw tobacco prices (in rands), its high correlation with the CPI is driven by 
the high correlation between the CPI and the exchange rate, specifically up to the early 
2000’s.  When the tobacco price is expressed in dollars its correlation coefficient 
reduces to 0.475 while the correlation between the CPI and the exchange rate is 0.906.  
It is hence possible that the CPI’s relationship to international tobacco price is driven 
mainly by exchange rate fluctuations.  This can be seen in Figure 6.2 below.   
Figure 6.2  Trends in the logarithmic variables of the CPI of tobacco products, the 
international price of raw tobacco (USD value), private consumption, the tariff 
rate, the exchange and the nominal excise tax rate 
 
Source: Statistics South Africa, World Bank GEM Commodities Database, SARB, Budget Review, UN 
COMTRADE & The South African Tariff Schedule, various years 
The figure above highlights a second interesting observation about the relationship 
between the raw tobacco prices and the CPI.  Post 2000, the exchange rate does not 
seem to be related to the CPI of tobacco prices.  However looking back at Figure 6.1 
after 2000, both the raw tobacco price (in dollars) and the CPI of tobacco products 
exhibit an upward trend.  This implies that before 2000, the exchange rate was more 
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tobacco.  After 2000 however, the international price of raw tobacco was more important 
in explaining the trends in cigarette prices than the exchange rate.  From the two graphs 
above, raw tobacco prices and the excise rate seem to be the strongest drivers of the 




7.1 The Augmented Dickey Fuller Test (ADF) 
 
An Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test is run on the series and their subsequent 
differences with the aim of determining whether the data are nonstationary and what 
their order of integration is.  The null hypothesis for this test is 
H0 : The series is nonstationary 
From the previous graphs, the CPI in tobacco products and the nominal excise rate 
exhibit substantial upward trends.  The ADF test for these two series is hence run with 




Table 7.1  Results of the ADF test 
Variable Level First Difference 
CPI 0.9913 0.0000* 
Raw tobacco price 0.9320 0.0000* 
Excise Rate 0.8355 0.0000* 
Tariff 0.9121 0.0000* 
Private Consumption 0.9980 0.0001* 
*p-value is significant at 5% level 
All variables are in natural logarithms 
 
For the level ADF, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of nonstationarity as none of the 
p-values are statistically significant at the 5% significance level and hence conclude that 
the series are all nonstationary.  Looking at the first difference the ADF, we reject the 
null hypothesis for all the variables since all the p-values obtained are statistically 
significant at the 5% significance level.  We hence conclude that the first differences of 
these series are stationary.  This implies that all the series data are integrated of degree 
one [I(1)].  The fact that all the data are integrated of the same order allows us to move 
on and test for cointegration. 
 
7.2 The Johansen Test of Cointegration 
 
Before running the Johansen test of cointegration, the number of appropriate lags to 
use for the test is has to be determined.  Based on the sequential likelihood ratio, the 
final prediction error (FPE), Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) and, the Hannan-Quinn 
information criterion (HQIC) 4 lags are deemed appropriate (Results in Section 9.2 of 
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Appendix).  The Johansen test of cointegration is hence run with 4 lags and the 
following results are obtained. 
Table 7.2  Results of the Johansen Test of Cointegration 
Maximum rank Eigen value Trace statistic 5% Critical value 
0 - 108.4714 68.52 
1 0.42854 59.2299 47.21 
2 0.32493 24.6516* 29.68 
3 0.13392 11.9987 15.41 
4 0.10445 2.2905 3.76 
5 0.02569   
*denotes result corresponding to number of cointegrating equations in data 
For the first three rows, our null hypotheses are 
H0: There is no cointegration 
H0: At most there is only one cointegrating equation 
H0: At most there are only two cointegrating equation 
 
The Johansen’s test starts with the test for zero cointegrated equations and then 
accepts the first null hypothesis that is not rejected.  This occurs at a maximum rank of 
2.  There are hence 2 cointegrating equations in our data.  The modelling of these 
equations is beyond the scope of this paper, however a preliminary analysis using 
Johansen’s test of cointegration shows that the nature of the relationship between the 
international raw tobacco prices and the CPI of tobacco prices is an indirect one, while 
the CPI is directly related to the rest of the series in our data (output in section 9.3 of 
Appendix).  Furthermore, now that the existence of cointegration has been established, 





7.3 Estimation of an Autoregressive Distributed Lag Model (ARDL) 
 
As mentioned previously, for the sake of preliminary analysis a model similar to the 
following single ARDL model equation is estimated.  All the data used are in logarithmic 
form.   
ΔCPIt = −(1-α){CPIt−1 −
𝛃𝟏+𝛃𝟐
1−α
 𝐗𝐭−𝟏} + β1ΔXt + εt 




Table 7.3  Results for the estimation of the ARDL model 
Explanatory Variable Coefficient 
CPIt-1 -.1525* 
(.04666) 
Raw tobacco prices t-1 .026* 
(.009947) 
Private Consumption t-1 .00668* 
(.02849) 
Tariff t-1 .04482 
(.03055) 
Excise rate t-1 .08905* 
(.03746) 
ΔRaw tobacco prices -.01333 
(.02281) 










*p-value is significant at 5% level 
All variables are in natural logarithms except the constant 
 
Looking at the first difference terms in our model, only the coefficient of the first 
difference of the excise rate is statistically significant at the 5% level.  There is hence a 
positive short run relationship between the excise rate and the CPI of tobacco products.  
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The coefficients on the lagged terms give an indicator of the long run relationship 
between the explanatory variables and the CPI of the tobacco products.  From our 
specification, the coefficient on the lagged terms of our explanatory variables should be 
recalculated as the beta coefficient of each lagged explanatory variable divided by the 
beta coefficient of the lagged CPI variable   Table 7.4 below hence has the recalculated 
coefficients as well as the percentage change in the logarithmic CPI of the tobacco 
products due to each explanatory variable.  The percentage change in the CPI of the 
tobacco products due to each explanatory variable is obtained for the period 1990 to 
2012 by finding the percentage change between the average CPI in 2012 and the 
average CPI in 1990. 
Table 7.4  Recalculated beta coefficients and percentage share of explanatory 
variable in change of logarithmic CPI variablel 
Variable Coefficient Percentage share of 
variable in change of log 
of CPI 
Raw tobacco price 0.1705 8.6% 
Private Consumption 0.4381 11.5% 
Tariff 0.2939 1.3% 
Excise rate 0.584 71.5% 
Unexplained variation  7.1% 
All variables are in natural logarithms 
 
Based on the table above, the most important variable in explaining the long run 
changes in the CPI of tobacco prices is the excise rate.  It explains approximately 
71.5% of the long run variation in the logarithmic change of the dependent variable.  




8.0 Implications and Discussion 
 
The results from both the cointegration test and the ARDL model indicate that indeed 
the excise rate, private consumption and the tariff are associated to changes in the CPI 
of tobacco products.  Specifically, there is a both a short and long run relationship 
between the CPI and the excise rate.  This implies that a change in the excise tax rate 
will result in a permanent change in the price of cigarettes.  There is also a long run 
relationship between the raw tobacco price, private consumption and the tariff however 
these relationships are secondary in importance to that of excise rates and CPI. 
The main objective of this paper was to determine what caused the real NOT cigarette 
price increases.  Results obtained indicate that a 1% increase in tobacco excise taxes 
lead to a less than 1% increase in the price of cigarettes in both the short run and the 
long run.  This does not explain the increase in the real NOT cigarette price increases.  
From the results obtained in section 7.0 above, the preliminary data analysis, and the 
graphical analysis; the real NOT price increase could possibly have been driven by a 
combination of the other explanatory variables (consumption, tariffs and raw tobacco) 
as well as the exchange rate (prior to 2000).  In light of this possibility, and the fact that 
the Johansen’s test of cointegration determined that there were two cointegrating 
vectors in the series data, the modelling of an ARDL model without accounting for the 
second cointegrating vector may give an incomplete picture of how the series interact 
with each other over time.  It is also worth noting that the model used a logarithmic 
excise tax term as an explanatory variable and hence indirectly assumed that the excise 
tax is levied ad valorem which is not the case in reality.  This could have possibly biased 
the results. 
Lastly, the model used also does not account for the effect that the market 
concentration of the cigarette industry would have on the price of cigarettes.  It is hence 




Conclusively, as a preliminary data analysis tool, the model used has served the 
purpose of showing that the relationships that are modelled theoretically do exist 
empirically.  Furthermore, the preliminary analysis through the Johansen’s test of 
cointegration has showed that in order to completely understand the short and long run 
relationships associated with cigarette prices, and hence thoroughly explain the rise in 
real NOT prices in the cigarette market, a model that accounts for the existence of 2 
cointegrating vectors must be used.  Based on the preliminary analysis, future research 
could extend the model used to account for the presence of 2 cointegrating factors, as 





Barnett, P. G., Keeler, T. E. & Hu, T. (1995). Oligoply structure and the incidence of 
cigarette excise taxes. Journal of Public Economics. 57(1):457 – 470. 
Becker, G. S. & Murphy, K. M. (1988). A theory of rational addiction. Journal of Political 
Economy. 96(4):675 – 500. 
Becker, G. S., Grossman, M. & Murphy, K. M. (1994). Am empirical analysis of cigarette 
addiction. American Economic Review, 84(3):396 – 418. 
Chaloupka, F. J. (1999) Macro-social influences: the effects of prices and tobacco-
control policies on the demand for tobacco products. Nicotine & Tobacco Research. 
1(1):577-581. 
Chaloupka, F.J. & Nair, R. (2000) International issues in the supply of tobacco: recent 
changes and implications for alcohol. Addiction. 95(12):477 – 489. 
Davis, P. & Garcés, E. (2010). Quantitative Techniques for Competition and Anti-trust 
Analysis. New Jersey, United States of America: Princeton University Press. 
Djutaharta, T., Viriya, S., Henry, P. N., Haidy, A., Hendratno, A. & Sri, M. (2005). 
Aggregate Analysis of the Impact of Cigarette Tax Rate Increases on Tobacco 
Consumption and Government Revenue: The Case of Indonesia. Washington, DC, 
United States of America: World Bank. 
Edwards, L. (2005). Has South Africa Liberalized its Trade? South African Journal of 
Economics, 73(4): 754 – 775. 
Engle R.F. & Granger C.W.J. (1987). Cointegration and error correction: 
Representation, estimation and testing. Econometrica. 55 (1):251 - 276. 
Euromonitor International, various years. Cigarette Brand Shares (by local brand name) 
data. 
European Commission. (2011). Fact Sheet on the interim Economic Partnership 




Farr, S., Tremblay, C. H., & Tremblay, V.J. (2001). The Welfare Effect of Advertising 
Restrictions in the U.S. Cigarette Industry. Review of Industrial Organization, 18(1):147 
– 160. 
Feenstra, R. (2002). Advanced International Trade: Theory and Evidence. California, 
United States of America: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Frieden, T. R., Mostashari, F., Kerker, B. D., Miller, N., Hajat, A & Frankel, M. (2002). 
Adult tobacco use levels after intensive tobacco control measures: New York City, 
2002-2003. American Journal of Public Health. 95(6). 
Helpman, E. & Krugman, P. R. (1989). Trade policy and market structure. Cambridge, 
United States of America: MIT Press. 
Harris, J. (1987). The 1983 Increase in the Federal Cigarette Excise Tax. In Tax Policy 
and the Economy, Volume 1. Summers, L. H. Ed. Cambridge: MIT Press. 87-112. 
Koch, S. F. (2004). Duopoly competition for rational addicts. South African Journal of 
Economic and Management Sciences. 7(2): 368 - 386. 
Levy, D. T., Benjakul, S., Ross, H. & Ritthiphakdee, B. (2008). The role of tobacco 
control policies in reducing smoking and deaths in a middle income nation: results from 
the Thailand SimSmoke simulation model. Tobacco Control. 17(1):53 – 59. 
Lovato, C., Linn, G., Stead, L. F. & Best, A. (2003). Impact of tobacco advertising and 
promotion on increasing adolescent smoking behaviours. The Cochrane database of 
systematic reviews, 2003(4): CD003439. 
MarketLine. (2013). Market Line Industry Profile: Tobacco in South Africa. Retrieved 16 
January, 2014, from MarketLine: http://www.marketline.com/. 
Quantec EasyData, various years. Exchange rate data for South African rand in United 
States dollars. 
Republic of South Africa, various years. Budget Review. Pretoria: Government Printer. 
Samimi, R. (1995). Road transport energy demand in Australia: A cointegration 
approach. Energy Economics. 17(4):329 - 339 
53 
 
Shum, M. (2011). Lecture 8: Product Differentiation. EC 105. Industrial Organization. 
Fall 2011. California Institute of Technology, United States of America. 
South African Reserve Bank, various years. Final Consumption Expenditure by 
Households. 
South African Revenue Services, 2013. EFTA. Retrieved 9 January, 2014, from South 
African Revenue Services: http://www.sars.gov.za/Legal/International-Treaties-
Agreements/Trade-Agreements/Pages/EFTA.aspx. 
South African Revenue Services, various years. Tariff Schedule 1. Retrieved 27 
January, 2014, from South African Revenue Services: www.sars.gov.za. 
Ssekuma, R. (2011) A study of cointegration models with applications. Unpublished 
dissertation. University of South Africa. 
Statistics South Africa, various years. Statistical release P0141.1: Consumer price index 
(CPI). 
Tremblay, C. H. & Tremblay, V. J. (1999) Re-interpreting the effect of an advertising ban 
on cigarette smoking. International Journal of Advertising. 18(1):41 – 50. 
Tsai, Y., Young, C.,Chen, C., Liu, T. & Chen, P. (2005). The effect of Taiwan’s tax-
induced increases in cigarette prices on brand-switching and the consumption of 
cigarettes. Health Economics. 14(1):627 – 641. 
United Nations Commodities Trade Statistics Database, various years. South African 
Imports, Exorts and Tariff Data for Cigarettes. 
Wipfli, H., & Samet, J. M. (2009) Global economic and health benefits of tobacco 
control: Part 2. Clinical Pharmacology & Therapeutics 86(3): 272-280. 
Van Walbeek, C. (2003). Tobacco excise taxation in South Africa. World Health 
Organization. 
Van Walbeek, C. (2005). The economics of tobacco control in South Africa. 
Unpublished Thesis. School of Economics, University of Cape Town. 
Van Walbeek, C. (2006). Industry Responses to the Tobacco Excise Tax Increases in 
South Africa. The South African Journal of Economics, 74(1): 110 – 122. 
54 
 
Wooldridge, J. M. (2009). Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach. Michigan, 
United States of America: Michigan State University. 
World Bank Global Economic Monitor Commodities database, various years. Raw 






10.1 Derivation of theoretical model 
Demand for the domestically produced cigarettes, q1 = a1 – b11p1 + b12p2 
Demand for the imported cigarettes, q2 = a2 – b22p2 + b21p1 




















Cross price elasticity of demand for the domestically produced cigarettes is dependent 





















It is assumed that both firms face constant marginal costs (c) and that both firms 
maximize their profits taking the other firm’s behavior as given.  Prices are hence set 
simultaneously without the firm’s knowing each other’s price choice.  The profit 
equations are hence as below; 
π1= p1q1 - cq1 
π1= (p1 – c)q1 
π1= (p1 – c) (a1 – b11p1 + b12p2) 
 
π2= p2q2-cq2 
π2= (p2 – c)q2 




First Order Conditions (Profit maximization) 
𝜕π1
𝜕𝑝1
= (p1 – c) (- b11) + (a1 – b11p1 + b12p2) = 0 
-b11p1 + cb11 + a1 – b11p1 + b12p2 = 0 
a1 + b12p2 = 2b11p1 - cb11 
a1 + b12p2 = b11(2p1 – c) 
a1 + b12p2
b11













= (p2 – c) (- b22) + (a2 – b22p2 + b21p1) = 0 
-b22p2 + cb22 + a2 – b22p2 + b21p1 = 0 
a2 + b21p1 = 2b22p2 – cb22 
a2 + b21p1 = b22(2p2 – c) 
a2 + b21p1
b22
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The inclusion of excise taxes 
 
π1= p1q1 - cq1 - eq1 
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π1= (p1 – c - e)q1 
π1= (p1 – c - e) (a1 – b11p1 + b12p2) 
 
π2= p2q2-cq2 – eq2 
π2= (p2 – c - e)q2 
π2= (p2 – c - e) (a2 – b22p2 + b21p1) 
 
First Order Conditions (Profit maximization) 
𝜕π1
𝜕𝑝1
= (p1 – c - e) (- b11) + (a1 – b11p1 + b12p2) = 0 
-b11p1 + cb11 +eb11+ a1 – b11p1 + b12p2 = 0 
a1 + b12p2 = 2b11p1 - cb11 - eb11 
a1 + b12p2 = b11(2p1 – c - e) 
a1 + b12p2
b11








 + c 2⁄  + 
e





= (p2 – c - e) (- b22) + (a2 – b22p2 + b21p1) = 0 
-b22p2 + cb22 + eb22+ a2 – b22p2 + b21p1 = 0 
a2 + b21p1 = 2b22p2 – cb22 – eb22 
a2 + b21p1 = b22(2p2 – c - e) 
a2 + b21p1
b22








 + c 2⁄  + 
e
2⁄         (4) 
59 
 
Again, assuming symmetric prices, the new equilibrium price after the imposition of the 
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2b22a1+b12 a2+b12b21p1+b12b22c + b12b22e 
4b22b11








































2b22a1+b12 a2+b12b22c+b12b22e + 2b22b11c+ 2b22b11e
4b22b11−b12b21
 



























The inclusion of tariffs 
Assuming that p2 = p3 + τ, where τ represents the tariff and p3 is the tariff exclusive 
foreign price, the reaction function of the importing firm can be recalculated as below.  
For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that the tariff is levied as a specific tariff.  The 
reaction firm of the domestic firm will stay the same as in the case where excise taxes 
were included. 
 
π2= p2q2- τq2-cq2 – eq2 
π2= {p2 – τ −  c −  e})q2 
π2= {p2 – τ −  c −  e} {a2 – b22(p2 − τ)  +  b21p1} 
 
First Order Conditions (Profit maximization) 
𝜕π2
𝜕p2
= (p2 – τ −  c −  e) (−b22) + {a2 – b22(p2 − τ) + b21p1} = 0 
–b22p2+ b22τ + b22c + b22e +a2– b22p2 + b22τ +  b21p1 = 0 
b22τ + b22c + b22e +a2 + b22τ + b21p1 = b22p2 + b22p2 
2b22p2 − 2b22τ − b22c −  b22e =a2+b21p1 












 + τ + c 2⁄ +
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2⁄         (5) 
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2⁄          (3) 
Again, assuming symmetric prices, the new equilibrium price after the imposition of the 
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2b22a1+b12 a2+b12b21p1+2b12τ+b12b22c + b12b22e 
4b22b11








































2b22a1+b12 a2+2b12τ+b12b22c+b12b22e + 2b22b11c+ 2b22b11e
4b22b11−b12b21
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10.2 Table showing results of Lag Selection Order Criteria 
 
Lag LL LR FPE AIC HQIC SBIC 
0 279.559  1.3 x 10-9 -6.2399 -6.1833 -6.0992 
1 993.973 1428.8 1.3 x 10-16 -21.9085 -21.5682 -21.0639* 
2 1015.69 43.43 1.3 x 10-16 -21.8338 -21.21 -20.2855 
3 1041.73 52.083 1.3 x 10-16 -21.8575 -20.9502 -19.6054 
4 1108.73 134.1* 1.3 x 10-17* -22.8132* -21.6223* -19.8573 





10.3 Table showing results of Johansen normalization 
 




Raw tobacco prices 0 
Private consumption -.3167 
Tariff -.0001992 





Raw tobacco prices 1 
Private consumption .7681 
Tariff -.5444 
Excise rate -.6588 
Constant -16.2659 
 
